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BLOCKING HOME: MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL SETTLES
BLACKOUT RESTRICTION CASE; HOWEVER, A
COLLISION WITH ANTITRUST LAWS IS
STILL INEVITABLE
“Make no mistake, this mission is not altruistic, . . . [b]aseball faces
fierce competition, including from other sports offerings and an increasing
slate of non-sports entertainment and leisure options.”1
I. BLACK ME OUT FROM THE BALL GAME: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE MLB’S BLACKOUT RESTRICTIONS
A 2013 Nielsen report stated, “[b]aseball and radio seem to go
hand-in-hand.”2  While this statement may be true, the same is true
about baseball and television, and even baseball and the Internet.3
Major League Baseball’s (MLB) connection to the Internet truly
began in 2000, when the MLB acquired the domain name
“MLB.com” from the Philadelphia law firm Morgan, Lewis, and
Bockius LLP.4  Two years later, MLB.tv debuted, allowing fans to
watch live baseball games over the Internet for the first time.5
1. Jacob Emert, MLB TV Settlement is ‘Big Win for Baseball Fans’, WASH. POST
(Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/01/
19/mlb-tv-settlement-is-big-win-for-baseball-fans/ [https://perma.cc/6RVC-UF7A]
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MLB’s lawyers).  For further discus-
sion of the settlement reached between the MLB and fans, see infra notes 162–165 R
and accompanying text.
2. Kavitha A. Davidson, Next Big Player in Digital Media: Baseball, BLOOM-
BERGVIEW (Jan. 22, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2016-01-22/next-big-player-in-digital-media-baseball [https://perma.cc/67MR-
FX3M] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting statement made in 2013 Niel-
sen report discussing sports’ media presence and baseball’s strong ties to radio).
3. See id. (discussing how baseball is now “major player in digital media” and
has very strong internet presence).
4. See Ross E. Davies, The Law Firm and the League: Morgan, Lewis and Bockius
LLP, Major League Baseball, and MLB.com, 39 BASEBALL RES. J. (2010), available at
http://sabr.org/research/law-firm-and-league-morgan-lewis-and-bockius-llp-major-
league-baseball-and-mlbcom [https://perma.cc/H997-SNW6] (detailing how Ma-
jor League Baseball acquired domain “MLB.com” from Morgan, Lewis, and Bock-
ius LLP).
5. See Ten Years Ago Today, MLB.TV Debuted, MLB.COM (Aug. 26, 2012), http:/
/m.mlb.com/news/article/37372302/ten-years-ago-today-mlbtv-debuted/ [https:/
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The first game the MLB live-streamed over the MLB.tv service
was the Texas Rangers at the New York Yankees on August 6, 2002.6
The game drew an online viewing audience of 30,000 fans from
over sixty different countries.7  Upon its debut, the service received
high praise from news sources and players alike.8  Among those giv-
ing the service positive reviews was New York Yankees shortstop
Derek Jeter who was optimistic about the service, stating, “[w]e may
get into a situation where you don’t have to have a specific channel
to see a game.”9
Over fourteen years after Jeter’s statement, Jeter’s hopes are
still only hopes.10  The MLB’s blackout restrictions on viewing
games are the only thing preventing Jeter’s vision from happening,
as the MLB “blacks out” games inside the home territories of teams
on MLB.tv.11  While Garber v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball12
(“Garber”) has greatly minimized the MLB’s blackout restrictions,
the restrictions still remain in place.13
The MLB, and baseball overall, is exempt from antitrust laws
and, therefore, has the ability to black out select games in certain
6. See id. (detailing how MLB.tv allowed fans to watch Yankees play Texas
Rangers online).
7. See id. (noting audience size to view game via live stream and where audi-
ence members were from).
8. See id. (referencing statements made about quality and importance of newly
launched MLB.tv service).
9. Id. (quoting Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter on his impression of new
MLB.tv service).  Jeter went on to say, “[i]t will reach more people, because fans
that follow teams but can’t see them because they live on the other coast will now
have a way to see their team play.” Id.
10. See Larry Neumeister, As Trial Was to Start, Settlement Reached in MLB TV
Dispute, THE BIG STORY (Jan. 19, 2016, 11:54 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
3d58da5f969a41108ac4d7a384ddbd6e/trial-was-start-settlement-reached-mlb-tv-dis
pute [https://perma.cc/PPD2-X3G7] (explaining even according to settlement
reached with fans, a cable subscription will still be required to view team games of
which fans are located inside the viewing area).  For further discussion of the set-
tlement reached between the MLB and fans, see infra notes 162–165 and accompa- R
nying text.
11. See Neumeister, supra note 10 (explaining how games inside viewing areas R
of teams would still be blacked out for those fans trying to watch online streams of
those games).  For further discussion of the MLB blackout restrictions, see infra
notes 117–131 and accompanying text. R
12. 120 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). See generally Second Amended Class
Action Complaint, Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 12-3704 (SAS)) (hereinafter Amended Complaint) (detailing
Garber case).  For further discussion of the settlement reached between the MLB
and fans in Garber, see infra notes 162–165 and accompanying text. R
13. See Neumeister, supra note 10 (explaining ways that effects of blackout R
restrictions have been minimized due to recent settlement).  For further discus-
sion of the settlement reached between the MLB and fans, see infra notes 162–165 R
and accompanying text.
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areas of the country.14  Baseball’s antitrust exemption is almost as
old as antitrust law, the Sherman Antitrust Act, itself.15  Since the
early 1900s, the MLB is the only professional sports league to have
such a broad exemption.16  The exemption itself comes from the
1922 Supreme Court case Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs17 (“Federal Baseball”), where the
Court declared “the exhibition [of baseball], although made for
money would not be called trade of commerce in the commonly
accepted use of those words.”18
Over thirty years later, in 1953, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to rethink its decision in Federal Baseball in the case
Toolson v. New York Yankees19 (“Toolson”).20  In Toolson, the Supreme
14. See Emert, supra note 1 (stating MLB is allowed to blackout certain games R
because of its antitrust exemption).  For a discussion and example of how base-
ball’s antitrust exemption affects the minor leagues, see infra note 227 and accom- R
panying text.
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890) (noting Congress enacted Sherman Antitrust
Act in 1890).
16. See David Greenberg, Baseball’s Con Game: How Did America’s Pastime Get an
Antitrust Exemption?, SLATE (July 19, 2002, 10:36 AM), http://www.slate.com/arti
cles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2002/07/baseballs_con_game.html
[https://perma.cc/8N3R-99K4] (detailing where MLB’s antitrust exemption came
from and providing history of MLB’s exemption); see also Shayna Goldman, A Brief
History of the Drawn Out Sports Television and Streaming Blackouts Debacle, SPORT-
TECHIE (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.sporttechie.com/2016/01/25/a-brief-history-
of-the-drawn-out-sports-television-and-streaming-blackouts-debacle/ [https://
perma.cc/CZF4-3DXX] (explaining how blackout restrictions work in various
sports and explaining that other sports leagues’ broadcasting agreements are also
exempt from antitrust laws).  “The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 exempted pro-
fessional sports league[s’ agreements] from federal antitrust law[.]” Id.  The Sher-
man Antitrust Act specifically states that antitrust law
[s]hall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in
or conducting the organized professional team sports of football, base-
ball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in
professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or oth-
erwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member
clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, bas-
ketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such
clubs.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291 (1961).
17. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  For further discussion of Federal Baseball, see infra
notes 61–74 and accompanying text. R
18. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 209.  The Supreme Court declared that any
effect baseball had on commerce was purely incidental. See Greenberg, supra note
16 (explaining exactly where MLB’s antitrust exemption came from).  For further R
discussion of Federal Baseball, see infra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. R
19. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).  For further discussion of Toolson, see infra notes
75–84 and accompanying text. R
20. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (stating Supreme Court had opportunity to R
remove baseball’s antitrust exemption with Toolson).  For further discussion of
Toolson, see infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. R
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Court effectively upheld its decision in Federal Baseball by stating
that if Congress had any issue with the ruling in Federal Baseball, it
would have drafted laws to make antitrust laws apply to baseball.21
Twenty years later in Flood v. Kuhn22 (“Flood”), baseball’s antitrust
exemption came before the Supreme Court once again.23  In Flood,
the Supreme Court once again upheld baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion, this time on the grounds of stare decisis.24
Baseball suffered its first antitrust exemption “loss” thirty years
after Flood with the signing of the Curt Flood Act.25  Signed into law
by President Bill Clinton, the Curt Flood Act made it so that base-
ball’s antitrust exemption no longer applied to employment related
issues.26  More importantly, the Curt Flood Act did not address the
exemption’s application to other areas of baseball’s operation.27
One area of operation that the Curt Flood Act did not address
was broadcasting agreements.28  The MLB’s blackout restrictions
exist because baseball’s antitrust exemption applies to broadcasting
agreements.29  The original purpose of the blackout restrictions was
to get more fans to go to ballparks to watch games in person.30
Today, however, the apparent purpose of the blackout restrictions
21. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (holding if antitrust laws apply to baseball,
Congress should enact effective laws).
22. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).  For further discussion of Flood, see infra notes 85–94 R
and accompanying text.
23. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (detailing how questions of baseball’s anti- R
trust exemption would come before Supreme Court again ten years after Toolson);
see also Flood, 407 U.S. at 259 (“For the third time in 50 years the Court is asked . . .
to rule that professional baseball’s reserve system is within the reach of the federal
antitrust laws.”).  For further discussion of Flood, see infra notes 85–94 and accom- R
panying text.
24. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 276, 282 (stating baseball’s antitrust exemption is
entitled to stare decisis).
25. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (stating Curt Flood Act was first law to chip R
away at baseball’s antitrust exemption); see also 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2000) (explaining
Curt Flood Act).  For further discussion of the Curt Flood Act, see supra notes
95–99 and accompanying text. R
26. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (describing effect Curt Flood Act had on R
baseball’s antitrust exemption).
27. See id. (detailing failure of Curt Flood Act to examine how baseball’s anti-
trust exemption applied to other areas of baseball’s operation).
28. See id. (stating topics Curt Flood Act failed to cover).
29. See Wendy Thurm, MLB’s Awful Blackout Rules are Finally Under Attack in
Court, DEADSPIN (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:18 PM), http://deadspin.com/mlbs-awful-black
out-rules-are-finally-under-attack-in-c-1683259431 [https://perma.cc/BH4U-
GNNY] (explaining how baseball’s antitrust exemption allows MLB’s blackout re-
striction to exist).  For further discussion of how baseball’s antitrust exemption
lead to the MLB’s blackout restrictions, see infra notes 117–131 and accompanying R
text.
30. See Lee Rood, Baseball Blackouts: Who’s Responsible for Viewing Hell?, DES
MOINES REG. (May 5, 2015, 10:02 AM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/
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is to control competition among broadcasters rather than to get
fans to go to games.31
The blackout restrictions have been subject to widespread
complaint because they are extremely confusing and unpopular
among fans.32  Fans’ complaints have not gone unheard, as the
MLB stated that they intended to do something about the outdated
blackout restrictions.33  In 2006, former MLB commissioner Bud
Selig expressed this intention, stating, “I hear more about people
who can’t get the game, . . . and, yes, I’ve already told our people
we have to do something about it.”34  Despite the MLB’s promises,
it took ten years and one massive class action lawsuit to make MLB
follow through on Selig’s statement.35
The MLB, and baseball in general, has had its antitrust exemp-
tion in place for just under one hundred years now.36  The MLB
has fought long and hard to keep the exemption in place, defend-
ing it before the Supreme Court numerous times.37  The settlement
in Garber marks the first time the MLB failed to defend baseball’s
antitrust exemption.38  Ultimately, the MLB severely cut back the
blackout restrictions, which thrilled fans.39  However, this may be a
news/2015/05/04/baseball-blackouts-responsible-viewing/26888559/ [https://
perma.cc/7SJD-TECJ] (detailing origins of MLB’s blackout restrictions).
31. See Thurm, supra note 29 (discussing potential reasoning behind blackout R
restrictions).
32. See Jeff Passan, Selig’s Promise, YAHOO! SPORTS (July 11, 2006, 9:11 PM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/seligs-promise-011100834—mlb.html [https://
perma.cc/4FEX-P9DC] (summarizing feedback from fans about popularity of
blackout restrictions).
33. See id. (detailing statements former MLB commissioner Bud Selig made
about dealing with blackout restrictions back in 2006).
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting former MLB commis-
sioner, Bud Selig, about issues with blackout restrictions).
35. See Davidson, supra note 2 (discussing settlement reached in Garber and R
how settlement affected blackout restrictions).
36. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (stating baseball’s antitrust exemption dates R
back to early 1900s).
37. See id. (discussing various times Supreme Court has heard cases challeng-
ing baseball’s antitrust exemption).  The cases brought before the Court were, in
chronological order, Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood. See id.
38. See Bob Van Voris & Gerry Smith, MLB Settlement Gives Baseball Fans New
Viewing Options, BLOOMBERG (last updated Jan. 19, 2016, 6:20 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-19/major-league-baseball-settles-with-
fans-over-game-telecasts [https://perma.cc/259Q-8KYW] (discussing settlement
with fans); see also Davidson, supra note 2 (stating MLB did not want go to trial in R
Garber case); Greenberg, supra note 16 (detailing previous times MLB has de- R
fended itself against antitrust claims).
39. See Van Voris & Smith, supra note 38 (explaining settlement reached in R
Garber case and new streaming options available to fans).  For further discussion of
the settlement reached in the Garber case, see infra notes 162–165 and accompany- R
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calculated loss for the MLB, as in settling Garber the MLB kept base-
ball’s antitrust exemption intact.40  Lately, the exemption has been
the target of a great deal of questioning.41  There were indications
that if the case went to trial, the judge would further narrow the
exemption’s scope, or worse, take it away altogether.42
Baseball’s antitrust exemption is a well-documented “anom-
aly.”43  In fact, it no longer applies to labor disputes, which made its
creation necessary in the first place.44  The exemption constantly
faces challengers, as the MLB continues to act in ways that would
otherwise violate antitrust law.45  This article will argue not only
that baseball’s antitrust exemption should not apply to the broad-
casting agreements that allow blackout restrictions to exist, but also
that baseball’s antitrust exemption requires further narrowing—
possibly stripping it away altogether.46
ing text.  For further discussion of the new streaming options available to fans, see
infra note 164 and accompanying text. R
40. See Emert, supra note 1; see also Van Voris & Smith, supra note 38 (detailing R
how U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin’s opinion of baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion could have hurt MLB if Garber went to trial).  For further discussion of how
Judge Scheindlin would have handled the case had it gone to trial, see infra notes
166–169 and accompanying text. R
41. See Van Voris & Smith, supra note 38 (discussing how U.S. District Judge R
Scheindlin ruled antitrust exemption would not be accepted defense against anti-
trust claims brought by fans in Garber).  For further discussion of how Judge
Scheindlin might have handled the case had it gone to trial, see supra notes
166–173 and accompanying text. R
42. See Van Voris & Smith, supra note 38 (detailing possible outcomes of R
Garber based upon rulings and statements Judge Scheindlin made in the past).  For
further discussion of how Judge Scheindlin might have handled the case had it
gone to trial, see supra notes 166–173 and accompanying text. R
43. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (stating baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption is “an anomaly”). See infra notes 75–94 and accompanying text (discuss- R
ing how previous cases have addressed history of baseball’s antitrust exemption).
44. See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text (detailing Curt Flood Act). R
The Curt Flood Act removed the labor issue from the reach of baseball’s antitrust
exemption, effectively getting rid of the reserve clause in MLB contracts. See infra
notes 95–99 and accompanying text.  The reserve clause was the issue that base- R
ball’s antitrust exemption was born from in Federal Baseball. See generally Fed. Base-
ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
45. See infra notes 132–155 and accompanying text (describing how MLB al- R
legedly violated antitrust laws in Garber).
46. See infra notes 114–231 and accompanying text (analyzing MLB broadcast- R
ing agreements under antitrust law and current case law).
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II. BUY ME AN ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND CRACKER JACK: THE
HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. Pregame Prep, Antitrust Basics
Generally, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 governs antitrust
law in the United States.47  The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed at
a time when monopolies ran rampant, engaging in a wide range of
anticompetitive activities.48  With the passage of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, Congress sought to put an end to these types of activities
and to the “prevention of restraints to free competition in business
and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market.”49  The Sherman Anti-
trust Act’s goal was to protect consumers injured by these anti-com-
petitive activities.50
The Sherman Antitrust Act specifically targets anti-competitive
activities that occur between the several states.51  Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act makes contracts that restrain trade or com-
merce among the States or with foreign nations illegal.52  Section 2
of the Sherman Antitrust Act also makes conspiring to monopolize,
or to attempt monopolize, trade or commerce among the states or
with foreign nations illegal.53  The Sherman Antitrust Act further
47. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (detailing various sections of Sherman Antitrust Act).
48. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492 (1940) (discussing his-
tory of Sherman Antitrust Act and circumstances around its enactment).
49. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 493 (examining legislative history of Sherman
Antitrust Act and defining reason for its enactment); accord Anticompetitive, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining anticompetitive as “[h]aving a tendency
to reduce or eliminate competition”).
50. See Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 493 (discussing further reasoning behind en-
actment of Sherman Antitrust Act).
51. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (defining scope of Sherman Antitrust Act).
52. See id. § 1 (laying out first category of illegal activities under Sherman An-
titrust Act and laying out penalties).  Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states
in full:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corpo-
ration, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Id.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (laying out second category of illegal activities under
Sherman Antitrust Act and laying out penalties).  Section 2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act states in full:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
7
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states that a violation of either section is a felony, punishable to
different extents dependent upon whether the person is an individ-
ual or a corporation.54  Ironically, alleged violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act are what led to baseball’s antitrust exemption.55
B. Antitrust Exemption Origins
Baseball’s antitrust exemption has its roots in labor disputes
and agreements.56  Before there was the MLB, there were several
different baseball leagues, including the American League and the
National League.57  In 1904, these two competing leagues eventu-
ally reached an agreement, called the National Agreement, which
effectively created the MLB.58  When the two leagues unified, the
American League adopted the National League’s “reserve clauses”
into their contracts.59  The reserve clauses bound players to a team,
and teams could buy or sell players’ contracts; however, when a
player’s contract expired, that player was not free to sign with an-
other team.60
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
54. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (defining penalties under Sherman Antitrust Act).
Section 3 of The Sherman Antitrust Act extends the coverage of the Act beyond
the several states and foreign countries to include “any Territory of the United
States or of the District of Columbia.”  15 U.S.C. § 3.  Section 4 of the Act gives the
district courts of the United States jurisdiction over all violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 4.
55. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (holding baseball exempt from antitrust laws after
baseball leagues allegedly violated the Sherman Antitrust Act).  For further discus-
sion of Federal Baseball, see infra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. R
56. See infra notes 61–74 and accompanying text (discussing how Federal Base- R
ball’s holding created baseball’s antitrust exemption).
57. See National Agreement, BASEBALL-REFRENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-refer
ence.com/bullpen/National_Agreement [https://perma.cc/4KF4-EBNY] (last vis-
ited Jul. 17, 2016) (stating before National Agreement National League and Amer-
ican League were two competing baseball leagues).
58. See id. (detailing agreement reached between National and American
League to create MLB).
59. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (discussing how American League adopted R
reserve clauses when it unified with National League).
60. See id. (explaining how reserve clauses operated).  This is starkly different
from the way contracts operate today.  When a contract ends in the MLB today,
players are free to sign with whatever team they wish. See id.
8
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1. Accusation Becomes Exemption
While the reserve clauses caused no problems within the newly
unified league, it caused a myriad of problems with other leagues
who tried to lure players away from the newly unified MLB.61  One
such league was the Federal League, which attempted to “lure”
players to their league by promising higher salaries.62  However, the
reserve clause prevented players from going to the other leagues
because the clause bound the players to their respective teams.63
The Federal League would go on to sue the MLB for “cornering the
player[ ] market,” alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.64  Eventually, the MLB and Federal League came to a settle-
ment in which the Federal League disbanded and its owners paid
off.65
Unfortunately, not all the owners of the Federal League were
happy with the settlement, such as the owners of the Baltimore Ter-
rapins, who rejected the settlement offer.66  The Terrapins’ owners
continued to pursue the antitrust claims against the MLB all the
way to the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball.67
The Federal League accused the National League and Ameri-
can League of “conspir[ing] to monopolize the base ball [sic] busi-
ness.”68  First, the Supreme Court examined the nature of how
baseball operated.69  The Court specifically looked at the travel that
occurred during the operation of baseball clubs, finding that “the
61. See, e.g., Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 200–09 (1922) (detailing how one Federal League team was
unhappy with reserve clauses in baseball contracts as it prevented them from lur-
ing players away).  For further discussion of the facts in Federal Baseball, see infra
notes 62–74 and accompanying text. R
62. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (explaining how Federal League attempted R
to compete with MLB).
63. See id. (discussing why Federal League failed to lure MLB players away).
64. See id. (explaining fallout of American League adopting reserve clauses
into their contracts and how doing so affected other baseball leagues).
65. See id. (detailing how majority of Federal League teams agreed to settle
with National and American Leagues, but some did not want to settle and went on
to bring lawsuits against National and American Leagues).
66. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., 269 F.
681, 682–83 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (giving facts of case), aff’d, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  The
Supreme Court chose not to restate the facts of the case in its opinion. See Federal
Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200–09.
67. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200–09 (detailing case and its holding).
68. Id. at 207 (explaining reasons suit was being brought against National and
American Leagues).
69. See id. at 208 (examining how both baseball clubs and leagues operate).
The Court stated that baseball clubs were in the business of making money.  In
order to make money, baseball clubs had to cross state lines to compete against
other clubs. See id.
9
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transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing.”70  Addition-
ally, the Court determined that baseball exhibitions were not trade
or commerce.71  After stating that baseball’s core operations did
not interfere with interstate commerce, the Court concluded that
the restrictions put in place by the reserve clauses did not interfere
with interstate commerce either.72  The Court found that an activity
interferes with interstate commerce or “in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States” is essential to proving a violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.73  Therefore, the Court concluded that
baseball, and its actions, was legally incapable of violating the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.74
2. Those Damned Yankees: The Supreme Court Affirms Federal
Baseball
The Supreme Court revisited its decision in Federal Baseball
years later in the 1953 case Toolson.75  The plaintiff, George Tool-
son, argued that, because of an alleged monopoly, he had been
“deprived of his livelihood.”76  Toolson had been playing for the
Newark International Baseball Club, Inc. when they assigned him to
the Binghamton Exhibition Company, Inc., a team for which he
70. Id. at 209 (explaining nature of travel in baseball).  The Court went on to
state that the travel was incidental to the exhibition, which was the essential thing.
See id.
71. See id. (detailing how baseball’s exhibitions, its games, were not trade or
commerce as Supreme Court understood those terms).  The Supreme Court stated
that baseball’s core operations “would not be called trade or commerce in the
commonly accepted use of those words.” Id.
72. See id. (giving Supreme Court’s reasoning for how other parts of baseball’s
operations did not affect interstate commerce either).  The Court made somewhat
of an overbroad statement here by simply stating that because one part of base-
ball’s operations did not affect interstate commerce, that no part of their opera-
tions did or could affect interstate commerce. See id. The Court concluded: “[a]s
it is put by defendant, personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of
commerce.  That which in its consummation is not commerce does not become
commerce among the States because the transportation that we have mentioned
takes place.” Id.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890); see also Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 209 (stating what
it takes to prove violation of Sherman Antitrust Act).
74. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 209 (describing reasoning of Supreme
Court in stating all baseball operations were exempt from application of and could
not violate Sherman Antitrust Act).
75. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (review-
ing decision made by Supreme Court years prior in Federal Baseball and reaching
similar conclusion).
76. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (detail-
ing facts of case and why Toolson sued Yankees and other MLB teams), aff’d, 200
F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952), aff’d, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).  The Supreme Court did not
recount the facts of the case in its opinion. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
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refused to play.77  Because of Toolson’s refusal to play, the MLB
placed him on the ineligible list and barred him from playing in all
of organized baseball.78  Subsequently, Toolson brought accusa-
tions of antitrust violations against the Yankees and other MLB
teams.79  The specific relief sought in this case was the overturning
of Federal Baseball and the retroactive application of antitrust laws to
the actions of the MLB over the past thirty years.80
The Supreme Court was brief in its opinion.81  Baseball had
operated for thirty years without antitrust laws applying to it, and
the Supreme Court refused to change that.82  Instead, the Court
suggested that if there were “evils” that would be fixed by antitrust
laws applying to baseball, Congress could have, and should, draft
legislation to make antitrust laws apply.83  The Court concluded by
affirming Federal Baseball, stating that its opinion in that case made
it clear that “Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”84
3. Faced with Flood, the Court Clings to Stare Decisis
In the years after the decision in Toolson, Congress took no ac-
tion, leaving baseball’s antitrust exemption unchallenged for an-
other twenty years.85  That is, until 1972, when the Supreme Court
would once again be asked to reconsider baseball’s antitrust exemp-
77. See Toolson, 101 F. Supp. at 93 (explaining further facts of case).
78. See id. (discussing repercussions of Toolson’s refusal to play for Bingham-
ton). Toolson had no other opinions of teams to play for, since, due the reserve
clause, the Binghamton Exhibition Company owned his contract.  For further dis-
cussion of how the reserve clauses operate, see supra notes 59–60 and accompany- R
ing text.
79. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (detailing accusations Toolson brought against
Yankees and other MLB teams and affirming judgments based on authority of Fed-
eral Baseball).
80. See id. (explaining relief Toolson sought in his case).
81. See id. (delivering opinion of Supreme Court).
82. See id. (stating, briefly, holding and opinion Supreme Court reached in
case).
83. See id. (detailing reasoning of Supreme Court in refusing to overturn Fed-
eral Baseball).  The Court concluded that “if there are evils in this field which now
warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.” Id.
84. Id. (stating what current Court believed Court in Federal Baseball
intended).
85. See Greenberg, supra note 16 (discussing how after holding in Toolson R
Congress did not create any new legislation to make antitrust laws apply to
baseball).
11
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tion in Flood.86  In Flood, labor and contract disputes were once
again the reason for challenging baseball’s antitrust exemption.87
In 1969, the St. Louis Cardinals traded one of their players,
Curtis Flood, to the Philadelphia Phillies without his knowledge or
consent.88  Due to his dissatisfaction with his new team, Flood
sought for the Commissioner of Baseball to terminate his contract
and let him become a free agent; however, the commissioner de-
nied his request.89  Flood’s displeasure with his new team caused
him to bring allegations of antitrust violations against the MLB for
its use of reserve clauses, or the “reserve system.”90
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court underwent a
lengthy analysis, including a review of both Federal Baseball and Tool-
son.91  Through its review of these and other cases, the Court even-
tually concluded that baseball’s antitrust exemption was an
“aberration.”92  The Court acknowledged, however, that despite be-
ing an aberration, the exemption was entitled to stare decisis be-
cause it “has been with us now for half a century.”93  The Court
once again reiterated that if antitrust laws were ever to apply to
86. 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (reviewing decision made by Supreme Court years
prior in Federal Baseball and Toolson).
87. See id. at 265–66 (detailing Flood’s reasons for bringing lawsuit against
MLB).
88. See id. (explaining facts of Flood and why Flood brought lawsuit against
MLB).
89. See id. (discussing facts of case and actions taken on behalf of MLB, which
Flood believed violated antitrust laws).
90. See id. at 265–67 (detailing accusations and allegations Flood brought
against MLB in his lawsuit).  A full list of accusations Flood brought included “vio-
lations of the federal antitrust laws and civil rights statutes, violation of state stat-
utes and the common law, and the imposition of a form of peonage and
involuntary servitude contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment.” Id. at 265–66.
91. See id. at 269–82 (examining and citing to precedential cases).  Cases that
the Court reviewed included Federal Baseball, Toolson, United States v. Shubert, United
States v. International Boxing Club, and Radovich v. National Football League. See id. See
generally United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955); United States v. Int’l Box-
ing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957).
92. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (describing how Court viewed baseball’s antitrust
exemption).
93. Id. (detailing how Court justified baseball’s exemption being “aberra-
tion”). The Court stated:
[I]t is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one
heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one
that has survived the Court’s expanding concept of interstate commerce.
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baseball, it would have to be a congressional decision, not a judicial
one.94
4. Congress Chips Away at the MLB’s Exemption
Twenty years later, Congress finally answered the Supreme
Court’s call in 1998 with the passage of the Curt Flood Act.95  Con-
gress passed the Curt Flood Act in a direct response to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Flood.96
The Curt Flood Act repealed baseball’s antitrust exemption,
but only with respect to labor-related issues.97  The Curt Flood Act
specifically allows current MLB players to file antitrust lawsuits
against the MLB, but only if the lawsuits related to or affected the
“employment of major league baseball players.”98  This repeal, how-
ever, only applied to litigation initiated by current MLB players and
did not apply to minor league players, “any other matter relating to
organized professional baseball’s minor leagues . . . franchise ex-
pansion, location or relocation, [or] franchise ownership issues, in-
cluding ownership transfers. . .  umpires . . . or any . . . persons not
in the business of organized professional major league baseball.”99
C. The MLB Stands its Ground After the Flood Act
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit case City of San Jose v. Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball100 (“City of San Jose”) considered a challenge
of baseball’s antitrust exemption.101  In City of San Jose, the City ar-
gued that the MLB violated state and federal antitrust laws when it
prevented the relocation of a baseball club.102
94. See id. at 285 (concluding opinion with statement Court would not make
decision on baseball’s antitrust exemption).
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b (delineating Curt Flood Act, which defined how base-
ball’s antitrust exemption applied to MLB labor issues).
96. See generally William J. Clinton, former President of the United States of
America, Statement on Signing the Curt Flood Act of 1998 (Oct. 27, 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55156 [https://perma.cc/JLM6-
VYZ8] (detailing statement President Clinton made upon the signing of Curt
Flood Act).  Congress even named the Curt Flood Act after Curtis Flood, the
player who brought the original suit against the MLB. See id.
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (defining scope of Curt Flood Act).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b) (stating Curt Flood Act only affected labor issues with
MLB players).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(1)–(6) (explaining aspects of baseball operations that
are still exempt from antitrust laws).
100. 776 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015).
101. See id. at 687–88 (detailing City of San Jose’s allegations of antitrust viola-
tions by MLB for stalling Oakland Athletics’ relocation request).
102. See id. (explaining basis for city of San Jose’s action against MLB).
13
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The case seemed simple enough; the Oakland Athletics were
suffering from declining revenue and attendance in Oakland and
wanted to move to San Jose in order to increase revenue and at-
tendance.103  However, according to the MLB Constitution, each
club must play within a certain operating territory, and San Jose was
part of the operating territory of the San Francisco Giants.104  This
rule effectively prevented the Athletics from moving to San Jose un-
less they received the approval of three-quarters of the MLB
clubs.105  In response to the Athletics, the MLB formed a relocation
committee to assess the impact of the potential move.106  After four
years of waiting for the MLB’s approval, the City of San Jose filed a
lawsuit accusing the MLB of violating antitrust laws by protecting
what the City saw as the Giants’ “local monopoly.”107
The City, citing Flood, argued that stare decisis applied only to
the reserve clause, not to the exemption laid out in Federal Baseball
and Toolson.108  However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the City,
and stated that baseball’s antitrust exemption applied to “the entire
‘business of providing public baseball games for profit between
clubs of professional baseball players.”109  The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that in passing the Curt Flood Act, Congress explicitly main-
tained baseball’s antitrust exemption for matters concerning
franchise relocation.110
While it ultimately ruled against the City, the Ninth Circuit
clarified its holding by stating, “[n]or does [this ruling] mean that
MLB or its franchises are immune from antitrust suit. There might
be activities that MLB and its franchises engage in that are wholly
collateral to the public display of baseball games, and for which an-
titrust liability may therefore attach.”111  However, the Ninth Circuit
103. See id. (detailing facts of case and what caused issues for city of San Jose).
104. See id. (stating how MLB constitution prevented Athletics from moving
without MLB approval).
105. See id. at 688 (detailing how Athletics could have received approval for
relocation).
106. See id. (discussing actions MLB took to examine Athletics’ potential
relocation).
107. See id. (stating city of San Jose felt MLB was purposely stalling Athletics’
request to relocate).
108. See id. at 689 (explaining San Jose’s argument antitrust laws should apply
to MLB’s actions in this case).
109. Id. at 690 (quoting Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357
(1953)) (examining the actions to which Supreme Court stated baseball’s antitrust
exemption applied).
110. See id. at 690–91 (explaining how Curt Flood Act factored into Ninth
Circuit’s ruling).
111. Id. at 690 (stating decision in City of San Jose did not broadly apply and
there are still actions to which baseball’s antitrust exemption does not apply).
14
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continued by saying the geographic “designation of franchises” was
not collateral but essential to baseball’s operations.112  The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that “interfering with [or changing] the franchise
relocation rules . . . indisputably interferes with the public exhibi-
tion of professional baseball.”113
III. LET ME ROOT, ROOT, ROOT FOR MY HOME TEAM: GARBER
MAKES A CASE TO REMOVE THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. Garber, a Whole New Antitrust Ball Game
The decision in City of San Jose made it clear that the standard
for examining where baseball’s antitrust exemption applies is
whether the given action is essential to the “business of providing
public baseball games for profit between clubs of professional base-
ball players.”114  From this ruling, it appeared that only the actions
listed in the Curt Flood Act were specifically exempt from antitrust
laws, leaving all others actions open to examination.115  One such
action open to examination was the MLB’s control of broadcast
rights and agreements.116
1. Broadcasting and Blackouts
Garber dealt with the MLB’s broadcasting agreements, blackout
restrictions, and antitrust exemption.117  The MLB’s blackout re-
strictions exist because baseball’s antitrust exemption applies to
broadcasting agreements.118  The MLB created its blackout restric-
tions in the 1960s, well before the days of cable.119  In the 1960s,
the MLB created a map of “home territories” for teams in an effort
112. Id. (reiterating franchise relocation was an action to which baseball’s an-
titrust exemption applied).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357) (taking from City of San Jose, gener-
ally, how to examine what actions to which MLB antitrust exemption applies).
115. See id. (examining how Curt Flood Act potentially applied to various ac-
tions of MLB).
116. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b(b)(1)–96) (failing to explicitly state
whether broadcasting rights and agreements are exempt or not exempt from anti-
trust laws).  For further discussion of 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b, the Curt Flood Act, see
infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. R
117. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at paras. 1–15 (detailing reasons R
plaintiff brought action against MLB and co-defendants in Garber).
118. See Thurm, supra note 29 (explaining how baseball’s antitrust exemption R
allows blackout restrictions to exist).
119. See Rood, supra note 30 (detailing origins of MLB’s blackout R
restrictions).
15
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to help protect their local television affiliates.120  These blackout
restrictions originated from the MLB’s practice of entering into
agreements with local broadcasters and giving the broadcasters ex-
clusive broadcast rights for a baseball club’s “home territory.”121  In
return, the MLB agrees not to stream the games of the team whose
“home territory” it is on MLB.tv, or broadcast the game on MLB
Extra Innings to any consumer within the “home territory.”122
The MLB claimed that the blackout restrictions’ purpose was
to entice fans inside a team’s “home territory” to go to that team’s
games.123  However, this claim is weak because the blackout restric-
tions apply to both home and away games for teams.124  The issue
with the map that the MLB created is that some teams’ “home terri-
tories” cover multiple states.125  For example, both the Milwaukee
Brewers’ and St. Louis Cardinals’ “home territories” extend well
into parts of Iowa.126  It is simply not feasible for a fan from Iowa to
make the trip to every home game of either of the two teams.127  As
a result of these situations, there have been many complaints by
fans who live in these overlapping territories, as it is almost impossi-
ble for them to watch their favorite teams even if they purchase
MLB.tv or MLB Extra Innings.128
The MLB’s response to these complaints has generally been
that all games are available for viewing on MLB.tv ninety minutes
after the end of the game; however, this does little to satisfy fans
120. See id. (discussing how and why MLB created blackout restrictions); see
also Home Territory Map [hereinafter Map], GAWKER MEDIA, available at https://i.
kinja-img.com/gawker-media/image/upload/tln8fsucu09cxadn2053.png [https:/
/perma.cc/9J36-UESY] (providing “home territory” map MLB currently uses for
blackout restrictions).
121. See Rood, supra note 30 (detailing how blackout restrictions operate). R
122. See id. (describing further how MLB blackout restrictions operate).
123. See id. (explaining one of MLB’s justifications for blackout restrictions).
124. See id. (stating how broadly blackout restrictions apply).
125. See Map, supra note 120 (showing how some teams’ “home territories” R
overlap).
126. See id.; Rood, supra note 30 (giving example of how MLB’s map of “home R
territories” is unrealistic for some fans); Erik Malinowski, WTF MLB? Baseball Strikes
Out with its Streaming Policies, ROLLING STONE (Jun. 5, 2015), http://www.rolling
stone.com/sports/features/wtf-mlb-baseball-strikes-out-with-its-streaming-policies-
20150605 [https://perma.cc/8HJH-R3LS] (detailing how Minnesota Twins fan lo-
cated in Iowa cannot watch Twins online because MLB “home territories”
overlap).
127. See Rood, supra note 30 (explaining further, how it is not feasible for R
some fans to go to games that are allegedly in their “home territories”); see also
Map, supra note 120. R
128. See Malinowski, supra note 126 (detailing how fans have grown frustrated R
with MLB’s blackout restrictions).
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who want to watch a live game.129  Instead, what this response
causes fans to seek out other, illegal, methods to watch games on-
line.130  However, using such methods carry with them an inherent
risk.131
2. The Basics of Garber
Garber was a class action lawsuit brought against the MLB by
two separate classes of plaintiffs: a television class and an Internet
class.132  The plaintiffs alleged multiple violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act on behalf of the MLB and its co-defendants.133  The
defendants also included the various broadcast partners of the MLB
and every MLB baseball club.134  The plaintiffs, including Fernanda
Garber, were fans of different MLB teams and had grown frustrated
with how the MLB constructed their broadcasting agreements.135
The plaintiffs accused the MLB of using an “illegal cartel” to “elimi-
nate competition in the distribution of games over the Internet and
television.”136  The plaintiffs claimed that they brought this lawsuit
to both challenge the cartel and remedy any damage the MLB’s use
of the cartel caused.137  Namely, they sought a remedy for the
“supra-competitive” prices they had to pay for sports and cable
packages due to the anti-competitive agreements of the cartel.138
129. See Rood, supra note 30 (discussing how MLB had responded to fans R
unhappy with blackout restrictions in their “home territory”).
130. See Malinowski, supra note 126 (detailing how one subscriber of MLB.tv R
got around blackout restrictions by using IP-masking client).
131. See Rood, supra note 30 (explaining possible penalty if MLB finds a fan R
using illegal methods to stream games through MLB.tv).  If the MLB discovers a
fan is using one of these methods, they will not only cancel their subscription but
also charge them a one-hundred dollar ($100.00) termination fee. See id.
132. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, para. 42 (detailing parties bring- R
ing lawsuit and how they were bringing them).
133. See id. para. 45(a)–(k) (laying out allegations against MLB and co-de-
fendants).  For further discussion of the specific sections of the Sherman Antitrust
Act the MLB allegedly violated, see infra note 151 and accompanying text. R
134. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, paras. 23–35 (detailing all par- R
ties plaintiffs were bringing allegations against).  The defendants included the Of-
fice of the Commissioner of Baseball, every MLB club, MLB Advanced Media,
Major League Baseball Enterprises, DirecTV, Root Sports, and Comcast. See id.
135. See id. paras. 16–22 (listing all plaintiffs and the damages they suffered).
Other plaintiffs included Mark Lerner, Derek Rasmussen, Robert Silver, Garrett
Traub, Vincent Birbiglia, and Peter Herman. See id.
136. Id. para. 2 (stating exactly what illegal actions plaintiffs believed MLB
and co-defendants were carrying on).
137. See id. paras. 2, 14–15 (explaining what plaintiffs sought from bringing
lawsuit against MLB and co-defendants).
138. See id. para. 11 (stating damages and inconveniences plaintiffs faced and
suffered as result of alleged anti-competitive actions of MLB and its co-
defendants).
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According to the plaintiffs, the defendants created the cartel
when they agreed “to divide the live-game video presentation mar-
ket into exclusive territories, which were protected by anticompeti-
tive blackouts.”139  The plaintiffs claimed that these agreements
were not essential to providing baseball contests and only served to
reduce competition in the “live-game video presentation mar-
ket.”140  Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that the MLB and its co-
defendants were in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.141
At the heart of these allegations was the MLB’s blackout pol-
icy.142  The plaintiffs stated that, by creating these broadcasting
agreements, the MLB and its co-defendants entered into a “conspir-
acy.”143  This alleged conspiracy used the MLB’s blackout restric-
tions to stabilize the prices of pay television packages, MLB Extra
Innings, and MLB.tv.144  They alleged that by blacking out games
everywhere but through the local broadcaster, fans who wanted to
watch an in-market game were forced to buy a certain service or
packages from the local broadcaster.145  In turn, this arrangement
allowed broadcasters to charge “supra-competitive prices” because
they controlled the fans’ only way to watch games in certain ar-
eas.146  These agreements also prevented local broadcasters from
139. Id. para. 2 (explaining exact actions MLB and its co-defendants took in
furtherance of their alleged conspiracy).
140. Id. (detailing why plaintiffs believed broadcasting agreements and black-
out restrictions of MLB were not exempt from antitrust laws).
141. See id. para. 45(a)–(k) (covering specific violations of Sherman Antitrust
Act plaintiffs alleged MLB and co-defendants of).  For further discussion of the
specific sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act the MLB allegedly violated, see infra
note 151 and accompanying text. R
142. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, para. 69 (stating blackout restric- R
tions were tool MLB and its co-defendants used to enforce and create anti-compet-
itive actions).  Further, to justify bringing the action, the plaintiffs in Garber cited
cases involving other sports leagues where plaintiffs brought similar actions, some
in which the parties settled and others in which the courts ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, paras. 3–8 (detailing precedent R
plaintiffs wanted to apply to Garber).  However, in these cases the plaintiff was
never the fan or consumer. See id. (examining, on a surface level, each of prece-
dential cases).  For further discussion of the MLB blackout restrictions, and how
they work, see supra notes 118–128 and accompanying text. R
143. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, paras. 69, 71. R
144. See id. paras. 70–72 (explaining extent of alleged conspiracy between
MLB and its co-defendants).
145. See id. paras. 74–97 (detailing how MLB and its co-defendants forced
plaintiffs, consumers, and fans into buying certain packages).
146. See id. paras. 11, 74–80 (describing how MLB and local broadcasters
worked together to force plaintiffs, consumers, and fans to pay supra-competitive
prices).
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broadcasting any out-of-market games.147  Therefore, any consumer
who wanted to watch out of market games that were not broadcast
on national television had to purchase an expensive MLB Extra In-
nings package or purchase MLB.tv’s “out of market” package.148  In
some cases the broadcasting agreements left plaintiffs and class
members with no way to watch games, either through local broad-
casters or through streaming options.149
As a result of these alleged violations, the plaintiffs sought very
specific relief.150  First, they sought penalization of MLB and its co-
defendants as provided for by Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman An-
titrust Act.151  Second, they asked the court to order the MLB to pay
three times the amount in damages sustained by the plaintiffs and
all members of the class, combined with the cost of filing the com-
plaint and attorney’s fees.152  Finally, the plaintiffs requested that
the court enjoin the MLB and its co-defendants from violating anti-
trust law any further than they already have with their actions.153
In May 2015, the presiding judge, U.S. District Judge Shira
Scheindlin, certified the class action lawsuit and also ruled that the
plaintiffs could only seek injunctive relief in the case.154  This
meant the plaintiffs could only get relief in the form of the MLB
147. See id. (detailing what local broadcasters got out of signing deals with
MLB).
148. See id. paras. 81–97 (explaining how agreements forced plaintiffs and
class to purchase expensive “out-of-market” packages).  Out-of-market packages
are “a bundle of all out-of-market games, from every team.”  Goldman, supra note
16. R
149. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, para. 88 (providing example of R
how some plaintiffs and members of class were blocked from watching some games
online).  The example given by the plaintiffs was that of a Mets fan in New York.
See id. paras. 10–11, 88.  The hypothetical fan had no access to any Mets streams
over the Internet, despite the fact that the MLB streamed Mets games over the
Internet elsewhere on a regular basis. See id. This same hypothetical fan could not
watch games with an MLB Extra Innings package, and therefore would be forced
by the MLB and its co-defendants to subscribe to a local television provider in
order to watch Mets games. See id.
150. See id. paras. A–G (detailing specific relief sought on behalf of plaintiffs
and class).
151. See id. paras. A–C (explaining first form of relief plaintiffs sought for
themselves and class).
152. See id. para. D (stating second form of relief plaintiffs sought for them-
selves and class).
153. See id. para. F (stating fourth and final form of relief plaintiffs sought for
themselves and class).
154. See Nathaniel Grow, The Impending Battle over the Future of Televised Base-
ball, FANGRAPHS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/the-impend-
ing-battle-over-the-future-of-televised-baseball/ [https://perma.cc/3SG8-JKJQ]
(detailing steps taken in pretrial phase by judge).  These steps included ruling out
all forms of relief aside from injunctive relief. See id.
19
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and its co-defendants changing their broadcast policies and not in
the form of monetary damages.155
3. Settlement in the Bottom of the Ninth
There was a lot riding on the outcome of Garber.156  Baseball’s
antitrust exemption was at risk of further chipping away, and the
MLB and its co-defendants were at risk of receiving a binding court
order.157 Garber remained on deck in the pretrial phase for just
over two years, the media excitedly following its progress as both
sides prepared for trial.158  Then, right before the trial began, the
MLB settled with the plaintiffs.159
B. Broadcasting Agreements and Antitrust Laws
Garber almost went to trial.160  The MLB defended itself fully
up until one week before the trial was to begin.161  It was clear from
the start that the MLB would be fighting an uphill battle.162  Ulti-
155. See id. (explaining what only having injunctive relief available meant to
both plaintiffs and MLB and its co-defendants).
156. See Ryne Horde & Eric Lindros, Garber v. Office of the Commissioner of Base-
ball: Why We Should Care, THE GOOD PHIGHT (Jan. 14, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://
www.thegoodphight.com/2016/1/14/10769818/garber-v-office-of-the-commission
er-of-baseball-why-we-should-care [https://perma.cc/VR57-L3YY] (detailing some
of the potential outcomes of Garber).
157. See Grow, supra note 154 (reiterating forms of relief judge had ruled out R
well before Garber was ever to go trial).
158. See Major League Baseball Settles Lawsuit over Television Blackouts, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.si.com/mlb/2016/01/19/garber-case-
settlement-tv-packages [https://perma.cc/5HU9-SJDB] (explaining how plaintiffs
first filed suit in Garber in 2012).
159. See Neumeister, supra note 10 (stating MLB and its co-defendants settled R
Garber case right before it was about to go to trial).
160. See id. (stating MLB defended its regional television contracts in pretrial
phase).
161. See infra notes 166–213 and accompanying text (discussing how Garber R
could have turned out for MLB if it had gone to trial).
162. See Jeff John Roberts, Baseball Fans Will Get Cheaper Prices in MLB Settle-
ment, ‘Blackouts’ Remain, FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://fortune.com/
2016/01/19/mlb-blackout-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/Z7ZM-RM6U] (noting
how Judge Scheindlin sided with fans in a similar class action complaint concern-
ing National Hockey League). See generally Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907
F. Supp. 2d 465, 480–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding National Hockey League’s black-
out arrangement did appear to be violation of antitrust laws).  In Laumann, plain-
tiffs brought as class action lawsuit similar to the lawsuit in Garber. See id. at 471.  In
fact, Laumann and Garber had some of the same plaintiffs, including Fernanda
Garber herself. See id. at 472 nn.7–8.  The plaintiffs in Laumann brought allega-
tions of Section 1 and 2 violations under the Sherman Antitrust Act against the
National Hockey League (the “NHL”), the MLB, and their regional sports net-
works partners, including Comcast and Fox Sports, with whom the NHL and MLB
had broadcasting agreements. See id. at 476.  Similar to the plaintiffs in Garber,
the plaintiffs in Laumann alleged that how the MLB and NHL, among others, di-
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mately, the MLB took the safe route and, in doing so, protected its
antitrust exemption.163  The settlement in Garber ultimately opened
up a variety of new streaming options for baseball fans.164  If Garber
went to trial, the court would have likely held that baseball’s anti-
trust exemption did not apply to broadcasting agreements, forcing
the MLB to reconfigure their broadcast agreements and possibly
end its use of blackout restrictions.165
vided up markets and distributed out-of-market games which “adversely affected
and substantially lessened competition in the relevant markets.” Id. at 475.  The
plaintiffs further alleged that the MLB and NHL’s practice of blacking out games
in order to protect these market divisions contributed to their anticompetitive ac-
tions. See id. at 471.  Ultimately, the court held that the claims of Section 1 viola-
tions could proceed against all the defendants in the case; however, the claims of
Section 2 violations could only proceed against the NHL and MLB. See id. at
480–92.
The outcome of Laumann would allow class action suits against the MLB to go
forward. See Bob Van Voris, MLB, NHL Fans Win Approval to Try and Change Way
Games Aired, BLOOMBERG (last updated May 14, 2015, 5:12 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-14/mlb-nhl-must-face-class-antitrust-
claims-u-s-judge-rules [https://perma.cc/6SPE-G8P2] (discussing outcome of
Laumann).  However, before the case could go any further, the NHL and the plain-
tiffs came to an agreement. See Van Voris & Smith, supra note 38.  According to R
this agreement, the NHL provided fans with single-team packages priced at least
twenty percent below the NHL’s current out-of-market packages. See id. The MLB
announced it would be offering a similar package because of this agreement as
well, prior to the settlement of Garber. See id.
163. See infra notes 205–231 and accompanying text (detailing what would R
have happened if Garber went to trial and how MLB prevented erosion of antitrust
exemption by settling).
164. See generally Class Action Settlement Agreement, Garber v. Office of the
Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 12-3704 (SAS))
(laying out settlement reached in Garber, including various forms of relief).  The
plaintiffs in Garber, and all MLB fans as an extension, received relief in four major
ways.  The first was single-club programming for both television and Internet, al-
lowing fans to but a cheaper package that only allows them to watch one team. See
id. para. 55.  Secondly, defendants must set cheaper prices for both MLB.tv pack-
ages and MLB Extra Innings Packages. See id. paras. 56–57.  The third was what
the MLB called a “Follow-Your-Team” package, which would allow fans to watch
the out-of-market stream of one specific team. See id. para. 58.  For example, if a
fan followed the Phillies and lived within the Phillies’ home territory, the fan could
watch the Mets stream of a Phillies vs. Mets game.  Finally, the MLB would provide
streams of in-market games to fans who could not view the games in any fashion.
See id. para. 60.
165. See Nathaniel Grow, End the Blackouts, THE HARDBALL TIMES (Jan. 14,
2015), http://www.hardballtimes.com/end-the-blackouts/ [https://perma.cc/
9NEN-6SZW] (stating if Garber went to trial outcome could be devastating for
MLB).  Grow states, “[w]hile the suit’s odds of success are uncertain, MLB would
be wise to fix its blackout restrictions now, on its own terms, rather than risk having
a judge or jury impose even more radical changes in the future.” Id.
21
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1. The MLB was Already Down in the Count
The case got off to an unfavorable start for the MLB with Judge
Scheindlin’s ruling that she would not let the MLB defend itself by
clinging to baseball’s antitrust exemption.166  In 2014, when the
MLB tried to get the case dismissed on antitrust exemption
grounds, she ruled that baseball’s antitrust exemption did not apply
to Garber and allowed the lawsuit to proceed.167  In addition, Judge
Scheindlin was not “afraid to break new ground” in the law, as
many expected her to do in Garber if it went to trial.168  Judge
Scheindlin had already ruled, in a similar case, that actions such as
the MLB’s broadcast agreements did violate the Sherman Antitrust
Act.169
The last time the issue of baseball’s antitrust exemption came
before the Supreme Court, it survived only on stare decisis.170
Since then, the MLB has continued to operate in anti-competitive
ways that would otherwise violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.171
Courts noted this, but they failed to act.172  However, with anything
not explicitly exempt in the Curt Flood Act now at question, it is
only a matter of time before Congress or the Supreme Court fur-
ther chips away at baseball’s antitrust exemption.173
166. See Emert, supra note 1; see also Grow, supra note 154 (detailing how in R
2014 U.S. District Judge Scheindlin ruled an antitrust exemption would not be
accepted defense against antitrust claims).
167. See Grow, supra note 154 (explaining further Judge Scheindlin’s state- R
ments and ruling).
168. Horde & Lindros, supra note 156 (quoting Dan McLaughlin (@baseball R
crank), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2016, 12:58 PM), https://twitter.com/baseballcrank/sta-
tus/686608236162646016?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw) (examining decisions Judge
Scheindlin made in past cases).
169. Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 492 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (stating MLB’s agreements did violate antitrust laws).  For further discussion
of Laumann, see supra note 162 and accompanying text. R
170. For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s holding and reasoning in Flood,
see supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. R
171. For a discussion of the anticompetitive actions the plaintiffs accused the
MLB of in City of San Jose, see supra notes 102–113 and accompanying text.  For an R
explanation of the anticompetitive actions of which plaintiffs accused the MLB in
Garber, see supra notes 132–155 and accompanying text. R
172. For a discussion of the anticompetitive actions the plaintiffs accused the
MLB of in City of San Jose, see supra notes 102–113 and accompanying text.  For an R
explanation of the anticompetitive actions of which plaintiffs accused the MLB in
Garber, see supra notes 132–155 and accompanying text. R
173. See City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686,
690 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining some actions antitrust exemption may not apply to
and which Curt Flood Act does not list).  For further discussion of City of San Jose,
see supra notes 100–113 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of how the R
ruling in City of San Jose left the antitrust exemption exposed, see infra notes
198–204 and accompanying text. R
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2. Evaluation Under the Sherman Antitrust Act
By settling Garber, the MLB protected itself.174  As Judge
Scheindlin ruled that the MLB would not be able to use baseball’s
antitrust exemption to defend itself, she next would examine if the
MLB and its co-defendants’ actions violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act.175  The plaintiffs accused the MLB and its co-defendants of vio-
lating Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.176  Technically, base-
ball is not exclusively exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act itself,
but from the wider field of antitrust law.177  Nonetheless, baseball is
exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act.178
Section 1 of The Sherman Antitrust Act makes “[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce” illegal.179  However, the Su-
preme Court clarified that Section 1 only makes illegal unreasona-
ble restraints on trade.180  To prove a violation of Section 1, a
plaintiff “must show (1) that there was a contract, combination, or
conspiracy[,] (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained
trade . . . and (3) that the restraint affected interstate
commerce.”181
The MLB and its co-defendants clearly and publicly entered
into contracts.182  These contracts unreasonably restrained trade as
174. See Nathaniel Grow, MLB Plays it Safe, Settles Television Lawsuit, IN-
STAGRAPHS (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/mlb-
plays-it-safe-settles-television-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/DLQ4-Z99E] (analyzing
settlement in Garber case).
175. See Emert, supra note 1; see also Grow, supra note 154 (expanding upon R
Judge Scheindlin’s 2014 ruling in Garber).
176. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, para. 45(a)–(k) (covering spe- R
cific sections of Sherman Antitrust Act plaintiffs accused MLB and co-defendants
of violating).  For further discussion of the specific sections of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act the MLB allegedly violated, see supra note 151 and accompanying text. R
177. See Joseph J. McMahon, Jr. & John P. Rossi, A History and Analysis of Base-
ball’s Three Antitrust Exemptions, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 213, 217 (1995) (stating
ruling in Federal Baseball did not make baseball exempt from Sherman Antitrust Act
specifically).
178. See id. (explaining baseball is still exempt Sherman Antitrust Act).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (addressing first category of illegal activities under Sher-
man Antitrust Act and penalties).  For further discussion of § 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, see supra note 52 and accompanying text. R
180. See Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) (stating Section 1 targets actions that “suppress” and “destroy”
competition).
181. Bahn v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991)
(describing three elements for violation of § 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act).
182. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at paras. 69–97 (describing R
broadcast agreements MLB and broadcast partners entered into, and harm they
caused).
23
Saldutti: Blocking Home: Major League Baseball Settles Blackout Restriction
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\24-1\VLS103.txt unknown Seq: 24 13-JAN-17 14:23
72 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24: p. 49
the contracts, and the blackout restrictions they operated around,
made it impossible for some fans to watch their favorite teams in
any way and made others pay for expensive content packages at
supra-competitive prices.183  This restraint affected interstate com-
merce as the blackout restrictions reached across states lines and
forced fans to purchase content packages at supra-competitive
prices.184  Therefore, Judge Scheindlin would have found the MLB
and its co-defendants to be in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.185
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act penalizes “[e]very per-
son who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce.”186  The plaintiffs in Garber argued
that the defendants did this by forming a “cartel.”187  To prove a
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a plaintiff must
show (1) that the defendant possesses monopoly power in the rele-
vant market and (2) that the defendant willfully acquired or main-
tained that power through exclusionary conduct toward the rest of
the market.188
Monopoly power, or the ability “to control prices and exclude
competition” in a given market, is present in the case of the MLB’s
broadcast agreements  as the MLB is able to control the prices of its
online packages while its co-defendants were able to do the same
with their television packages.189  Further, by signing the broadcast
agreements, the MLB and its co-defendants acted willingly in ob-
taining their monopoly power and acted in an exclusionary manner
by picking and choosing which broadcasters to sign to these
183. See id. at 81–97 (detailing how broadcast agreements harmed fans, plain-
tiffs, and class).
184. See id. (describing further how broadcast agreements harmed fans, plain-
tiffs, and class).
185. See id. at 70–97 (discussing broadcast agreements MLB entered into and
harm they caused); Bahn, 929 F.2d at 1410 (stating element plaintiff must prove to
successfully bring violation of section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act Claim).  For fur-
ther discussion of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see supra note 52 and accom- R
panying text.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (laying out second category of illegal activities under Sher-
man Antitrust Act and penalties).  For further discussion of § 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, see supra note 53 and accompanying text. R
187. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at paras. 2–3 (seeking remedy R
for defendants’ illegal cartel).
188. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)
(describing elements for violation of section 2 of Sherman Antitrust Act).
189. Id. at 571 (defining “monopoly power”); see Amended Complaint, supra
note 12, at paras. 81–97 (describing agreements MLB and broadcast partners en- R
tered into and blackout restrictions used to implement them).
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deals.190  Therefore, based on prior case law, Judge Scheindlin
would have found the MLB and its co-defendants in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.191
3. Evaluation as Part of “Business of Baseball”
While it is clear that the MLB’s broadcasting agreements vio-
late antitrust law, the real question involves determining whether
antitrust law applies to baseball and the MLB.192  There are those
who believe that baseball’s antitrust exemption should not apply to
broadcasting restrictions.193  However, that could not be further
from the truth.194
a. Finding the Gap
Since Toolson, the general rule seems to be that any action that
is part of the “business of baseball” is exempt from antitrust laws.195
Courts that have taken the majority approach seem to have taken a
broad approach as to what constitutes the “business of baseball.”196
However, after the ruling in City of San Jose, this approach seems to
strike out.197
190. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at paras. 70–97 (explaining how R
broadcasting agreements operate).
191. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at paras. 70–97 (explaining how R
broadcasting agreements operate). See Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71 (stating
element plaintiff must prove to successfully bring violation of section 2 of Sherman
Antitrust Act Claim).  For further discussion of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
see supra note 53 and accompanying text. See also Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey R
League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 480–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding National Hockey
League’s blackout arrangement did appear to be violation of antitrust laws).
192. See supra notes 174–191 (examining allegation made in Garber complaint R
under Sherman Antitrust Act).
193. See Jacob Ware, Note, Intentional Pass: Analyzing Baseball’s Antitrust Exemp-
tion as Applied to Broadcasting Agreements in Laumann v. National Hockey League, 49
GA. L. REV. 895, 918 (2015) (discussing why broadcasting agreements should be
exemption from antitrust laws).
194. See infra notes 195–213 (detailing why antitrust laws should apply to R
MLB’s broadcasting agreements)
195. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1952) (stating what
actions were exempt from antitrust law).
196. See Ware, supra note 193, at 923 (detailing majority of courts have R
“broadly interpret[ed]” “business of baseball” when analyzing what was covered by
baseball’s antitrust exemption).
197. See City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686,
690 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining there are some actions within “business of base-
ball” that may not be exempt from antitrust laws).  For a general discussion about
City of San Jose, see supra notes 101–113 and accompanying text.  For a discussion R
on how the ruling in City of San Jose left the antitrust exemption exposed,  see supra
notes 198–204 and accompanying text. R
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The passage of the Curt Flood Act and the decision in City of
San Jose exposed baseball’s antitrust exemption to attack.198  The
Curt Flood Act already removed labor disputes and the reserve
clauses from what the exemption covered.199  The Ninth Circuit ad-
hered closely to the language of the Curt Flood Act in the City of
San Jose ruling.200  The court adhered so closely, in fact, that the
Ninth Circuit pondered whether the exemption only applied to
that which the Curt Flood Act itself covered.201  The Ninth Circuit
went on to state that there may be actions that are part of the busi-
ness of baseball that are not exempt from antitrust laws.202  In fact,
the business of baseball is not as all-encompassing as it seems.203
This potentially leaves actions not explicitly covered in the Curt
Flood Act outside the scope of the exemption.204
b. The “Unique Characteristics and Needs” Standard
The interplay between the Curt Flood Act and the ruling in
City of San Jose effectively created a grey area.205  Courts have clari-
fied this grey area by narrowing the scope of baseball’s antitrust
exemption to actions that are “integral to the sport and not related
activities which merely enhance its commercial success.”206  The Su-
198. See id. City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (stating some “business of baseball”
actions may not be exempt from antitrust laws).  The Ninth Circuit stated that any
actions not specifically listed as being exempt from antitrust law may be at ques-
tion. See id.
199. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b (removing labor issues from coverage of baseball’s
antitrust exemption).  For further discussion of the Curt Flood Act, see supra notes
95–99 and accompanying text. R
200. See City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (stating how Curt Flood Act factored
into Ninth Circuit’s ruling).  For a general discussion about City of San Jose, see
supra notes 101–113 and accompanying text. R
201. See City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (explaining there are some actions
antitrust exemption may not apply to and were not listed in Curt Flood Act).
202. See id.
203. See Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Frame-
work for Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 557, 620 (2010) (stating there are some parts of the “business of
baseball” baseball’s antitrust exemption does not cover).
204. See City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (explaining further how Curt Flood
Act factored into Ninth Circuit’s ruling).
205. For a discussion on the interplay between the Curt Flood Act and City of
San Jose, see supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text. R
206. Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp.
263, 265 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (detailing how, when examining radio broadcast agree-
ments, Henderson court took narrower approach to defining “business of baseball”
to only essential elements of “business of baseball”).  The court stated “broadcast-
ing [in general] is not central enough to baseball to be encompassed in the base-
ball exemption.” Id.  See Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F.
Supp. 1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (adopting limited view of baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption as applied to umpire employment), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d
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preme Court supported this concept in Flood when it stated that
baseball’s antitrust exemption had to take into account its “unique
characteristics and needs.”207  This analysis regarding which parts of
the “business of baseball” are exempt from antitrust law is often
called the “Unique Characteristics and Needs” standard.208
Examining the allegations made in Garber under this lens, it
becomes clear that the MLB’s broadcasting agreements and black-
out restrictions are not within the scope of the “business of base-
ball” activities that are exempt from antitrust law.209  As they are
currently set up, the agreements only serve to help the MLB and its
broadcasting partners charge supra-competitive prices for their
content packages.210  As the agreements are made to “merely en-
hance [the] commercial success” of the MLB, they are outside the
exemption.211  Further, the broadcasting agreements are not
unique to baseball because various other leagues also have broad-
casting agreements.212  Therefore, as more recent courts have
leaned toward the “Unique Characteristics and Needs” standard,
broadcasting agreements are outside the scope of baseball’s anti-
trust exemption.213
Cir. 1993).  The holding in Postema stated “from antitrust challenges to its league
structure and its reserve system . . . [not] anti-competitive behavior in every con-
text in which it operates.” Id. at 1488–89. Henderson was one of the many cases the
plaintiffs in Garber relied on when making their argument. See Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 12, at para. 8. R
207. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (stating baseball’s antitrust
exemption should only apply to actions that are specific to baseball).
208. See Grow, supra note 203, at 589–90 (explaining “Unique Characteristics R
and Needs” standard used to determine what “business of baseball” actions are
exempt from antitrust laws).
209. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at para. 45(a)–(k) (covering spe- R
cific provisions of Sherman Antitrust Act plaintiffs alleged MLB and co-defendants
violated).  For further discussion of the specific sections of the Sherman Antitrust
Act the MLB allegedly violated, see supra note 151 and accompanying text. See R
Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 265 (stating, explicitly broadcasting is not within scope
of antitrust exemption).
210. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at paras. 74–80 (describing how R
MLB and local broadcasters worked together to force plaintiffs, consumers, and
fans to pay supra-competitive prices).  For a discussion on how these actions violate
antitrust laws, see supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text. R
211. See Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at paras. 74–80 (detailing al- R
leged violations of antitrust laws); see also Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 265 (discussing
how Henderson court narrowed scope of exemption to actions which are “integral
to the sport and not related activities which merely enhance its commercial
success”).
212. See, e.g., Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (explaining how MLB and
NHL have similar broadcasting agreements).  For further discussion of Laumann,
see supra note 162 and accompanying text. R
213. See Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475,
1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (adopting limited view of baseball’s antitrust exemption),
27
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C. A Sign of What is on Deck
As baseball’s antitrust exemption is under attack, Garber marks
its third challenge in the past five years.214  Recently blackout re-
strictions and broadcasting agreements have taken the brunt of the
scrutiny.215  Baseball’s exemption has been chipped away at over
the years, and by settling Garber the MLB avoided having its broad-
casting agreements removed from the exemption’s scope.216  It is
clear that had Garber gone to trial, the MLB would have lost the
case, and the court would have held that broadcasting agreements
were not within the scope of the “business of baseball” actions that
are exempt from antitrust law.217  However, the game is far from
over.218  Although Judge Scheindlin finalized the settlement, there
are plaintiffs who remain unhappy with the final terms.219  In total,
thirteen class members objected to the settlement, leaving the door
open for further future lawsuits.220
rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at
265 (narrowing scope of “businesses of baseball” to unique elements); City of San
Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 690 (9th Cir. 2015) (ex-
plaining there are some actions within “business of baseball” that may not be ex-
empt from antitrust laws).
214. For a discussion on the challenge to the baseball antitrust exemption in
City of San Jose, see supra notes 101–113 and accompanying text.  For a discussion R
on the challenge to the baseball antitrust exemption in Garber, see supra notes
132–155 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on the challenge to the baseball R
antitrust exemption in Laumann, see supra note 162 and accompanying text. R
215. For a discussion on the challenge to the baseball antitrust exemption in
Garber, see supra notes 132–155 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on the R
challenge to the baseball antitrust exemption and discussion of the NHL’s black-
out restrictions in Laumann, see supra note 162 and accompanying text.  For fur- R
ther discussion on the MLB’s broadcasting agreements and blackout restrictions,
see supra notes 117–131 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on how the R
MLB’s broadcasting agreements and blackout restrictions violate antitrust laws, see
supra notes 174–185 and 205–213 and accompanying text. R
216. For a discussion on how Congress addressed the antitrust exemption, see
supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.  For an explanation of Garber, see supra R
notes 162–165 and accompanying text. R
217. For a discussion on the ramifications if Garber had gone to trial, see supra
notes 174–185 and 205–213 and accompanying text. R
218. See Grow, supra note 174 (stating both Judge Scheindlin and all members R
of class must approve settlement to finalize it).
219. See Pete Brush, $200M MLB Antitrust Deal Cutting Cost of Web Streams OK’d,
LAW360 (Apr. 25, 2016, 10:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/788712/
200m-mlb-antitrust-deal-cutting-cost-of-web-streams-ok-d [https://perma.cc/
L2NQ-RGZA] (detailing circumstances around finalized settlement).  The settle-
ment received final approval on April 25, 2016; however, not all members of the
class approved. See id.  Concerning the class members who objected to the settle-
ment, Judge Scheindlin stated, “[f]ans would certainly have preferred more
changes but that’s not the way settlement works.” Id.
220. See Zachary Zagger, MLB Fans Push for Antitrust Deal OK Despite Protests,
LAW360 (Apr. 20, 2016, 10:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/786845/mlb-
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Recent developments have led to greater support for legisla-
tion such as the Furthering Access and Networks for Sports Act (the
“FANS Act”).221  The FANS Act aims to eliminate all blackout re-
strictions across sports, and to potentially wipe out baseball’s anti-
trust exemption altogether.222  The FANS Act, on its face, states its
purpose is “[t]o decrease the frequency of sports blackouts, [and]
to require the application of the antitrust laws to Major League
Baseball.”223  The FANS Act aims to do this by amending the Curt
Flood Act.224  This would be very similar to the approach the Ninth
Circuit took in City of San Jose.225  In fact, Senators John McCain
and Richard Blumenthal reintroduced the FANS Act in 2015.226  By
fans-push-for-antitrust-deal-ok-despite-protests [https://perma.cc/5FTB-AX9W]
(stating thirteen class members objected to settlement terms).  The majority of the
objectors believed that the settlement did not “do more to stop in-market black-
outs or overturn the regional market system entirely.” Id.
221. See S. 1721, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1721/text [https://perma.cc/6DEW-2K7L] (ex-
plaining FANS Act).
222. See id. (stating purpose of FANS Act).
223. Id.
224. See id. §§ 4–5 (explaining how Curt Flood Act would be amended). The
FANS Act would remove the language “any conduct, acts, practices or agreements
that do not directly relate to or affect employment of major league baseball players
to play baseball at the major league level, including but not limited to.” Id.
§ 4(2)(A).  By doing this, the FANS Act would greatly expand what “business of
baseball” actions are subject to antitrust laws by limiting what actions are exempt
from antitrust law to those explicitly stated in the Curt Flood Act. See generally id.
In explaining the reasoning behind the FANS Act, Senator Richard Blumen-
thal stated:
Special breaks should be stopped for professional sports leagues that im-
pose anti-consumer blackout policies leaving their fans in the dark. . .
Leagues that enjoy antitrust exemptions and billions of dollars in subsi-
dies and other benefits should give their fans fair access to their favorite
teams on TV.  This legislation would protect fans who now get the short
end of the stick from leagues that treat the public with contempt while
continuing to enjoy public benefits.  Fans deserve to be put first—or at
least treated fairly.
Shayna Goldman, NHL Reaches Landmark In-Market Streaming Deal with Fox Sports,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jul. 14, 2016), http://www.si.com/tech-media/2016/07/14/
nhl-fox-sports-streaming-market [https://perma.cc/9ASX-MWHY] (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting Richard Blumenthal) (supporting goals of FANS
Act).  The FANS Act would also “remove the language from the [Sports Broadcast-
ing Act of 1961] that grants the leagues the ability to force local broadcasters to
blackout home games when that team fails to sell most of their tickets.”  Goldman,
supra note 16. R
225. See City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (stating how Curt Flood Act factored
into Ninth Circuit’s ruling and how Ninth Circuit looked at what Curt Flood Act
explicitly exempt from antitrust laws).  For further discussion of City of San Jose, see
supra notes 101–113 and accompanying text. R
226. See John Eggerton, FANS Act Reintroduced, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Dec. 17,
2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/news/congress/fans-act-reintro-
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settling Garber, it appears that the MLB has only delayed the
inevitable.227
As various courts have pointed out over the years, baseball’s
antitrust exemption is an anomaly.228  In fact, the exemption no
longer covers the very issue that first granted baseball its antitrust
exemption.229  Baseball is currently the only professional sport with
an antitrust exemption.230  Congress continually diminishes this ex-
emption, which baseball should not, and will not, have much
longer.231
IV. FOR IT’S ONE, TWO, THREE STRIKES THE MLB’S OUT: AN END
TO THE EXEMPTION AND BLACKOUTS
In the end, the MLB decided to give the plaintiffs in Garber an
intentional walk, instead of facing off against them at the plate.  As
the lawyers for the MLB stated after the settlement of Garber,
duced/396082 [https://perma.cc/GZ7L-M8JR] (detailing how two senators rein-
troduced FANS Act and were praised for doing so).
227. For an explanation of the broadcasting agreement with regard to base-
ball’s antitrust exemption, see supra notes 214–226 and infra notes 227–231 and R
accompanying text. But see Ryan Fagan, Despicable ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ Aims to
Screw Minor Leaguers, SPORTINGNEWS (Jun. 29, 2016), http://www.sportingnews
.com/mlb/news/minor-league-save-americas-pastime-act-salaries-antitrust-exemp
tion-broshuis-congress/1jjn290g1ubcd18af2tjyb1u7l [https://perma.cc/Z7S5-
HPXH] (detailing how unfair minor league salaries draw more attention to base-
ball’s antitrust exemption).  Baseball’s antitrust exemption keeps minor leaguer
players exempt from minimum wage standards. See id. This allows the MLB to pay
minor leaguers arbitrary salaries that often fall below what minimum wage would
deem acceptable. See id. Two members of Congress introduced the Save
America’s Pastime Act, which would uphold the minimum wage law exemption to
minor league teams. See id.  The proposed Act received a strong negative response
because the Act would put a cap on minor league salaries rather than raising them
to an acceptable level as compared to the large salaries of MLB players. See id.
228. For a discussion on how previous cases have addressed baseball’s anti-
trust exemption, see supra notes 75–94 and accompanying text. R
229. See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text (detailing Curt Flood Act). R
The Curt Flood Act removed labor issue from the reach of baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption, effectively getting rid of the reserve clause in MLB contracts. See supra
notes 95–99 and accompanying text.  The reserve clause was the issue that base- R
ball’s antitrust exemption was born from in Federal Baseball. See generally Fed. Base-
ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
230. See Kavitha A. Davidson, Antitrust Exemption Holds Baseball Back a Century,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 8, 2014, 10:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/ar-
ticles/2014-04-08/antitrust-exemption-holds-baseball-back-a-century [https://
perma.cc/PQM5-NR6H] (stating MLB is only professional sport with antitrust
exemption).
231. See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text (detailing how Congress R
chipped away at baseball’s antitrust exemption with Curt Flood Act). See supra
notes 214–231 and accompanying text (discussing why baseball should lose its anti- R
trust exemption, and how it may come about).
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol24/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\24-1\VLS103.txt unknown Seq: 31 13-JAN-17 14:23
2017] BLOCKING HOME 79
“[m]ake no mistake, this mission is not altruistic[.]”232  While this
may be true, the claim that their goal with the settlement was to
help fend off “fierce competition” may not be the complete
truth.233  The MLB potentially faced a ruling that would hold that
baseball’s antitrust exemption did not apply to broadcasting
agreements.234
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in City of San Jose left baseball’s anti-
trust exemption open to attack.235  By declining to analyze base-
ball’s antitrust exemption beyond the reach of the Curt Flood Act,
the Ninth Circuit left the door open for future courts to examine
the exemption’s application to other topics, such as broadcasting
rights.236  This, combined with the fact that the MLB knew they
would be fighting an uphill battle, made taking Garber to trial very
risky for the MLB.237
If the MLB had taken the case all the way to trial, it was possi-
ble, and highly likely, that the court would rule in favor of the class.
By settling Garber, the MLB changed their streaming and blackout
policies on their own terms, instead of being forced to comply with
a court order.  However, the most important outcome from settling
the case before trial was that baseball’s antitrust exemption re-
mained untouched.  It is clear that the MLB’s current broadcasting
agreements violate antitrust law.238  They are most likely not cov-
ered by baseball’s antitrust exemption, nor should they be; there-
fore, they should be subject to the scrutiny of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.239
232. Emert, supra note 1 (quoting MLB’s lawyers on the MLB motive behind R
settlement of Garber).
233. See id.; see also supra notes 160–231 and accompanying text (explaining R
what could have happened had Garber gone to trial).
234. See Emert, supra note 1 (detailing how Judge Scheindlin ruled in Garber). R
For further discussion of how Judge Scheindlin might have handled the case had it
gone to trial, see supra notes 166–169 and accompanying text. R
235. See City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (explaining there are some actions
antitrust exemption may not apply to and the Curt Flood Act does not list).  For
further discussion of City of San Jose, see supra notes 101–113 and accompanying R
text.  For further discussion of how the ruling in City of San Jose left the antitrust
exemption exposed, see supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text. R
236. See City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690 (refusing to examine scope of MLB’s
antitrust exemption beyond Curt Flood Act).
237. See supra notes 166–173 and accompanying text (discussing challenges R
MLB faced if Garber went to trial).
238. See supra notes 174–191 and accompanying text (examining how MLB’s R
broadcast agreements violate antitrust laws).
239. See supra notes 192–213 and accompanying text (analyzing why broad- R
casting agreements should fall outside scope of baseball’s antitrust exemption).
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A movement has been building in recent years to further strip
away baseball’s antitrust exemption, centered around the blackout
restrictions the MLB currently has in place.  This movement has led
to the re-introduction of the FANS Act, which would not only end
the blackout restrictions, but would almost entirely remove base-
ball’s antitrust exemption.240
Baseball’s antitrust exemption is nearly one hundred years
old.241  When the Supreme Court granted baseball its antitrust ex-
emption, none of the sitting justices on the Supreme Court could
have ever foreseen the great change that the Internet, or even tele-
vision, would bring to baseball.  The Supreme Court granted the
exemption for baseball as it existed in 1922, not how it exists to-
day.242  For as advanced as the MLB has become with MLB.tv and its
various cable packages, there are many who believe that baseball,
and the MLB by extension, is a sport stuck in the past.243  The MLB
still focuses on fans going to the ballpark, despite offering a myriad
of other ways of watching games.  This may not be the case much
longer, though, as the MLB may soon be facing a blackout of its
own: a blackout from its antitrust exemption.
William F. Saldutti IV*
240. See S. 1721, 113th Cong. (2013) (detailing FANS Act and what it aims to
accomplish).  For further discussion of the FANS Act, see supra notes 221–224 and R
accompanying text.
241. See Davidson, supra note 230. R
242. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 200–09 (1922) (detailing holding in Federal Baseball and grant-
ing baseball its antitrust exemption).
243. See Carlos Correa, Baseball Is Not Dying, SOLE COLLECTOR (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://solecollector.com/news/2016/04/carlos-correa-baseball-is-not-dying
[https://perma.cc/2EST-EPWV] (stating Houston Astros shortstop Carlos Cor-
rea’s opinion of how many aspects of baseball are “stuck in past”).  Correa states,
“[t]he game of baseball is beautiful, classic, traditional and . . . stuck in the past.
We’ve romanticized the game’s past so much that we’ve forgotten about its future.”
Id.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.S. in Food Marketing, Saint Joseph’s University, 2013. I would like to thank
my family, friends, and everyone who supported me throughout the writing pro-
cess and beyond.  I would especially like to thank my father, Bill, for introducing
me to and teaching me about the great game of baseball.
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